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ABSTRACT
Imagine playing a game of catch with three people, and all the things that would
influence to whom you throw. Were thoughts of death included as one of those factors?
The hypothesis that mortality salience motivates avoidant behavior toward a worldviewthreatening target was empirically tested on a sample of 200 undergraduate Caucasian
college students from a Midwestern university. I induced participants to write about
either their own death or dental pain, and presented them with summer descriptions of
three fictitious male African American targets that they believed they were going to
interact with later in the study. Targets' descriptions were manipulated to be either
consistent, neutral, or inconsistent with American stereotypes commonly associated with
African Americans. Participants completed several personality and attitude measures
about themselves and targets, and then played a simulated game of catch called cyberball
over the internet, supposedly with the three targets who were in different locations.
Participants demonstrated a preference to toss the ball more to a stereotype
inconsistent African American male target regardless of mortality salience condition or
participants' individual level of need for closure. Attitude and trait ratings mirrored the
above results, with the exception of attitude ratings toward the stereotype consistent
target, in which need for closure moderated the effects of mortality salience. Participants
in the mortality salience condition who were high in need for closure rated the stereotype
consistent target less favorably than both neutral and stereotype inconsistent targets.
These results suggest that mortality salience may not demonstrate the prominent
effects on attitudes and behaviors that terror management theory has suggested (Solomon,

Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004). However, the results do imply that stereotypes
influence behavioral interaction with and favorability toward African Americans. In
accordance with research on the effects of social exclusion, the increased avoidance of an
African American based on his or her consistency with prominent African American
stereotypes may in fact evoke behaviors that validate these negative stereotypes (i.e.,
hostility, social loafing, and decreased cognitive ability) and thus perpetuate the
stereotypes associated with African Americans.
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CHAPTER 1
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
With whom we interact is influenced by many factors and circumstances, ranging
from simple immediacy (Latane, Liu, Nowak, Bonevento, & Zheng, 1995) to individual
attitudes and preferences (Ickes, 1984). There is little doubt that stereotypes and prejudice
influence with whom we interact and how we interact with them (Allport, 1954).
However, recent research suggests that thoughts of death may actually influence these
attitudes (Schimel et al., 1999) and behaviors (Ochsman & Mathy, 1994, as cited in
Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004). According to terror management theory
(Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski,
1991), an awareness of death can influence how people act toward others (McGregor et
al., 1998), with whom they associate (Deschesne, Greenberg, Arndt, & Schimel, 2000),
and how they feel about themselves (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, &
Schimel, 2004b). The goal of the current study is to further understand the effects of
mortality salience on social interactions. Specifically, it addresses whether mortality
primes can elicit avoidance of a worldview-threatening target.
Terror Management Theory
Terror management theory (Greenberg et al., 1986; Solomon et al., 1991) was
inspired by the writings of Ernest Becker (1973, as cited in Solomon et al., 2004) and
proposes that the awareness of inevitable death creates internal conflict with instinctual
desires for continued existence. This conflict, if unmanaged, would create paralyzing
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terror that would engross all cognitive functioning. An essential assumption of terror
management theory (TMT) is that humans have adapted to this paralyzing fear by
distracting themselves with various cultural conceptions ofreality using (a) cultural
world views and (b) self esteem to buffer the anxiety and hence manage the terror
associated with death (Solomon et al., 2004).
According to TMT, cultural worldviews are socially validated, self-constructed
beliefs about the world that serve to shield individuals from the paralyzing realization of
their own mortality (Solomon et al., 2004). Self-esteem is then acquired through
believing in the validity of these worldviews and the perception that one is living up to
the standards of value associated with one's worldviews (Pyszczynski et al., 2004b).
So how do worldviews and self-esteem protect people from their underlying fear
of death? TMT proposes that people have a need to believe (at least unconsciously) that
they are part of a meaningful existence that endures past their own death. Validation of an
individual's worldview concordantly validates the assumption that all of his or her
worldviews and beliefs are accurate, making the thought of his or her own death less
frightening (Arndt, Cook, & Routledge, 2004). This validation is hypothesized to create a
personal feeling of significance and meaningfulness in the world that also mitigates the
terror association with death (Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1992; Pyszczynski et al.,
2004b). Similarly, self-esteem helps deal with fears of non-existence because it also
creates feelings of importance and meaningfulness, removing the fear of simply being a
transient being in a meaningless world (Pyszczynski et al.). From a TMT perspective,
living up to one's own cultural standards of value imbues a sense of literal or symbolic
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meaningfulness that is achieved through any number of avenues, such as adherence to
religious beliefs (Jonas & Fischer, 2006), identification with a larger group (Arndt,
Greenberg, Schimel, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2002), identification with
accomplishments (Dechesne, Greenberg, et al., 2000), or even belief in symbolic
immortality through reproduction (Solomon et al., 1991 ). A central tenet of TMT is the
hypothesis that if a psychological structure's purpose is to provide protection from the
fear of death, then the need for this structure should be increased when death is salient
(Dechesne et al., 2003; Greenberg et al., 1990; Pyszczynski et al., 2004b; Rosenblatt,
Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). In well over 200 studies, research has
shown that both self-esteem and faith in one's cultural worldview act as buffers against
the anxiety caused by a cognitive awareness of death (Pyszczynski et al.). Increased selfesteem, whether experimentally induced or dispositionally inherent, reduces the effects of
mortality salience (i.e., increased death thought accessibility or anxiety; see Pyszczynski
et al. for review). Similarly, mortality salience increases favorability ratings of those who
support one's worldviews and decreases favorability of those who threaten these
worldviews (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990). In fact, mortality salience increases aggression
toward and derogation of worldview-threatening targets (McGregor et al., 1998).
Interestingly, worldview defense does not occur directly after becoming aware of
one's own mortality. People often deny their vulnerability to death when mortality is in
focal attention but not after a delay or distraction, suggesting that there are two distinct
defenses against the inherent fear of death (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon,
1997; Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997). First, proximate
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thoughts of death are suppressed to protect against the anxiety induced by the awareness
of death. Then, when death is not in immediate focal attention, ~istal defenses are enacted
that symbolically defend against the unconscious knowledge of death by necessitating
unconscious or instinctual urges to validate one's cultural worldviews (Greenberg, Arndt,
Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2000; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, &
Breus, 1994). For this reason, research using explicit manipulations of mortality salience
often use distracter tasks such as the positive and negative affect scale (PANAS; Watson
& Clark, 1994), short excerpts unrelated to death such as the Growing stone distraction
task (Greenberg et al., 1994), or even word puzzles (Greenberg et al.).
Although delay and distraction are standard methodological practices, proximate
defenses can also be circumvented by using subliminal primes, such as presenting the
word "DEATH" for 42.8 ms (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, et al., 1997; Landau,
Goldenberg, et al., 2006) or the numbers 911 to American participants (Yum & SchenckHamlin, 2005). Simply being in immediate proximity of a funeral home can enact the
effects of mortality salience, increasing death-thought accessibility and the need to
validate cultural worldviews (Pyszczynski et al., 1996). The fact that these primes are
found to be just as effective suggests that mortality primes could be more prevalent than
once thought, and could be influencing more behavior than many would like to believe.
Mortality salience (MS) has a multitude of effects on individuals' attitudes.
Mortality salience increases preferences for a worldview-validating target (Greenberg et
al., 1990), increases self-reported affiliation with winning sports team (Dechesne,
Greenberg, et al., 2000), and even leads to more positive evaluations of a worldview-
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validating target (Mikulincer & Florian, 1997). The influence of mortality salience is not
restricted to attitudes, however. Thoughts of death cause participants to sit farther from a
worldview-threatening target (Ochsmann & Mathy, 1994 as cited in Solomon et al.,
2004), decrease peoples' comfort with and compliance in desecrating a flag or using a
crucifix as a hammer (Greenberg, Simion, Porteus, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1995), and
even increase how much a person will donate to a particular charity (Jonas, Greenberg, &
Frey, 2003). Mortality salience can increase fitness activity (Arndt, Schimel, &
Goldenberg, 2003) and has been found to influence peoples' driving behaviors
(Taubman-Ben-Ari, 1999). Overall, mortality salience demonstrates a great breadth of
influence on both attitudes and behaviors alike.
Criticisms ofTMT
Terror management theory is often criticized for its perspective on the function of
self-esteem. According to TMT, self-esteem functions as an anxiety buffer from the
existential fear of death, which suggests that mortality salience should elicit actions to
bolster self-esteem (see Pyszczynski et al., 2004b for review). Leary (2004) argues that
self-esteem serves no such function, citing research that found no differences between
experimental and control conditions in enhancement of self-evaluations after a mortality
salience prime (Sowards, Moniz, & Harris, 1991 ). In rebuttal, Pyszczynski, Greenberg,
Solomon, Arndt, and Schimel (2004a) pointed out that Sowards et al. (1991) failed to
incorporate a delay or distraction after the mortality salience prime, which is necessary to
elicit self-esteem bolstering as a distal defense to thoughts of death (Arndt, Greenberg,
Pyszczynski et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 2000; Greenberg et al., 1994).
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Further research cited by Leary and Schreinndorfer (1997) opposing the
hypothesis that self-esteem serves as an anxiety buffer from thoughts of death found that
self-esteem scores are significantly lower immediately after mortality salience in
comparison to baseline scores (Chaudhary, Gardiner-Parks, & Hass, 1994, as cited in
Leary & Schreindorfer, 1997). This finding directly contradicts what TMT would predict,
suggesting that self-esteem may not serve to protect against the anxiety associated with
thoughts of death. Although TMT researchers have not accounted for this unexpected
decrease in self esteem immediately after a death prime, Pyszczynski et al. (2004a)
suggest that Chaudhary et al. 's (as cited in Leary & Schreindorfer) results should remain
suspect because of unexpected changes in self-esteem scores that were also observed in
control conditions, suggesting that this decrease could be caused by something other than
mortality salience.
Critics have also criticized terror management theory on a conceptual level,
pointing out that a psychological structure that evolved to protect against the fear of death
would have no evolutionary benefit (Leary & Schreindorfer, 1997). How could
something that works to shield or distract from thoughts of death be evolutionarily
beneficial? Fear is inherent for a reason and is necessary for survival. TMT does not
disagree with this claim but suggests that the realization of absolute annihilation is
paralyzingly frightening and cultural worldviews help to distract from thoughts of death
in order to properly function (Pyszczynski et al., 2004a). It does not suggest in any way
that this psychological process makes humans any worse at detecting life threatening
situations. Others have similarly criticized TMT's assumption that death elicits a
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"paralyzing" fear because there is no evidence for this (Leary, 2004). In rebuttal,
Pyszczynski et al. suggest that the lack of direct evidence of this fear actually supports
the theory, because all "functioning adults have been socialized into a worldview imbued
with meaning and personal significance" (p. 487).
According to terror management theory, humankind's needs for culture and selfesteem are thought to have evolved gradually along with their emergent awareness of
death (Pyszczynski et al, 2004b). However, Leary (2004) has criticized this aspect of
TMT, stating that culture is a relatively recent phenomenon, emerging around 40,000
years ago. He suggests that TMT has major conceptual problems in the theoretical
explanation of how or why self-esteem would have emerged as an evolutionarily adaptive
mechanism to protect us from thoughts of death which, problematically, did not occur
until relatively recently in our ancestral past. In response to this criticism, Pyszczynski et
al. (2004a) points out that although "culture" is thought to be a relatively recent
occurrence in evolution, it was still a gradual process that dates back much further then
Leary suggested. There is evidence of ritual burial of the dead up to 100,000 years ago,
long before this genuinely accepted appearance of culture. This archeological evidence
demonstrates that early hominids were aware of death and had a general form of culture
that was passed down through generations, suggesting that "culture" is a much older
construct than previously thought.
Another criticism of terror management theory is its strict adherence to the
assumption that death (i.e., absolute and utter non-existence) is mankind's greatest fear
and is thus at the core of the phenomena TMT purports to explain (Leary, 2004). Many
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researchers adamantly disagree with TMT's proclamation, and suggest that these same
effects can be explained in a more parsimonious way. Of these arguments, two different
hypotheses arise in an attempt to explain why the anxiety associated with thoughts of
death elicits an increased need to validate cultural worldviews and bolster self-esteem: (a)
aversive thoughts and (b) uncertainty.
Some researchers suggest that worldview validation and self esteem-bolstering
are not unique to thoughts of death but are common to all aversive events such as pain,
social exclusion, or even giving a public speech. In support of this hypothesis, trait selfesteem is unrelated to thoughts of death and is in fact negatively correlated with thoughts
ofrejection, suggesting that social exclusion may actually create more anxiety than
thoughts of death (Leary & Schreindorfer, 1997). Leary (2004) suggests that social
exclusion calls into question a person's relational value (i.e., self-esteem) and, according
to sociometer theory, should elicit self-esteem bolstering not because of increased
thoughts of death but because thoughts of exclusion lower self-esteem. According to
sociometer theory, self-esteem is a metaphoric gauge that, when low, enacts processes to
increase self-esteem to a normal level (Leary, 2004). Others suggest that social exclusion
and ostracism may also lead to increased death-thought accessibility because the act of
being ostracized threatens one's self-esteem and simultaneously demonstrates what it
would be like essentially to not exist (Dechesne & Kruglanski, 2004). However, repeated
research using social exclusion (Landau, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Martens,
2006; Schimel, et al., 1999, study 4) and other aversive events such as thoughts of
experiencing intense pain (Greenberg et al., 1994, study 2), dental pain (Schimel et al.,
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study 2), failure (Hirshberger, Florian, & Mikulincer, 2005, study 1), an upcoming exam
(McGregor et al., 1998, study 1), and giving a public speech (Greenberg et al., study 2)
have failed to produce effects that replicate those associated with thoughts of death
(Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997).
The uncertainty hypothesis similarly suggests that TMT researchers have actually
been studying the effects of uncertainty elicited from thoughts of death, creating an
increased need for worldview validation and self-esteem bolstering (Leary, 2004).
Supporting research has found that trait self-esteem is more strongly related to thoughts
of uncertainty than those of non-existence (Leary, Saltzman, & Bednarski, 1995, as cited
in Leary & Schreindorfer, 1997). Thoughts of death obviously do entail a great deal of
uncertainty, making it difficult to differentiate whether thoughts of death cause bolstering
of self-esteem or whether it is actually the uncertainty associated with death that impacts
self-esteem. Support for the uncertainty hypothesis shows that evidence of an afterlife
moderates the effects of mortality salience, suggesting that thoughts of death may not
actually be directly responsible for increasing the need for worldview validation and selfesteem bolstering (Deschesne et al., 2003). Further research has found that threats to an
individual's cultural worldview increase the accessibility of words associated with death
(Schimel, Hayes, Williams, & Jahrig, 2007) and that bolstering of self worth reduces
death-thought accessibility (Mikulincer & Florian, 2002). These results suggest that
although uncertainty may be inherent in thinking about death, and play a moderating role
in the relation between the anxiety associated with thoughts of death and worldview
validation, worldview-threats have a unique relation to thoughts of death.
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Need for Closure Moderating Mortality Salience
In response to criticisms of TMT that suggest that the effects of mortality salience
could be due to the uncertainty associated with death, terror management theorists turned
to lay epistemic theory and the concept of cognitive need for closure. Kruglanski,
Webster, and Klem (1993) operationalize need for closure (NFC) as a cognitive desire for
certainty and avoidance of ambiguity. According to lay epistemic theory (Kurglanski,
1989), people high in NFC desire quickly to attain information but then are no longer
motivated to process any further information relevant to the topic, thus avoiding any
discrediting information (Kruglanski et al., 1993). Those high in NFC essentially find
uncertainty aversive, and accordingly attempt to avoid this aversive state by accepting
any immediate information that would provide closure. Those low in NFC, however, are
more at ease with uncertainty and demonstrate less avoidant behavior toward uncertainty
(Kruglanski et al.). The culmination of this research on individual differences in NFC
suggests that there could be individual variation in responses to the uncertainty associated
with death, creating the possibility that NFC could have a moderating role in an
individual's response to mortality salience.
Research integrating lay epistemic theory and TMT finds that those who score
high in NFC react differently to mortality primes than those who score low. People who
score high in NFC (vs. those who score low) utilize much more rigid strategies to deal
with the uncertainty associated with death. As an example, when an individual's in-group
is criticized, people who score high in NFC will defend the group by derogating the critic
(Dechesne, Janssen, & van Knippenberg, 2000). They are also more susceptible to the
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fear inherent in thinking about death and attempt to avoid the ambiguity and uncertainty
associated with death. When given an extended period of time to write about thoughts of
death, those who score high in NFC have shorter responses and respond more quickly
than those low in NFC. When given the opportunity only to write one sentence about the
feelings that death evokes, individuals who score high in NFC express distress and
avoidance (Dechesne, Janssen, et al.).
Those who score low in NFC are not totally unaffected by mortality salience,
however. Need for closure simply helps determine the nature of reactions to mortality
salience (Dechesne, Janssen, et al., 2000). Those who score low in NFC favor selfenhancing strategies to manage their concerns about death (Dechesne & Kruglanski,
2004). For example, when faced with a worldview-threatening target who criticized
participants' in-group (i.e., nationality), those low in NFC distanced themselves from the
criticized group to preserve a positive sense of self, instead of derogating the critic
(Dechesne, Janssen, et al., 2000). Those low in NFC can do this because they are less
avoidant of uncertainties, and thus can be more flexible in their response to mortality
salience conditions. They are also less avoidant of the uncertainty inherent in
contemplating mortality and are therefore more curious about death and consequently
take more time responding and respond in greater detail to questions about death
(Dechesne, Janssen, et al.). When forced only to write one sentence about the feelings
that death creates, people who score low in NFC tend to write about general acceptance
and curiosity about their own death (Dechesne & Kruglanski, 2004).

12

According to lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski, 1990), those who score high in
NFC are more likely to use and rely on stereotypes because these constructs provide
certainty and an organized view of the world (Dechesne & Kruglanski, 2004). This
preference for certainty is also related to strong preferences for similar others and a
strong aversion toward those who express dissimilar opinions (Kruglanski & Webster,
1991). In fact, Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, and De Grada (2006) suggest that high NFC
is associated with a syndrome they describe as "group-centrism," which is characterized
by increased group conformity, in-group favoritism, out-group derogation, political
conservatism, and rejection of those who deviate from the norm (Krunglanski, Shah,
Pierro, & Mannetti, 2002; Shah, Kruglanski, & Thompson, 1998). According to TMT,
these preferences for stereotypes and increased use group identification should then be
exaggerated after mortality salience. Accordingly, after MS, participants who score high
in NFC demonstrate increased in-group identification (Dechesne, Janssen, et al., 2000),
recall more stereotypic information (Dechesne, Janssen, et al.), and demonstrate
increased preferences for a stereotype-confirming individual (Schimel et al., 1999)
compared to those who score low in NFC.
Stereotypes, Prejudices and Preferences
Stereotypes are often considered to be socially validated categorizations of
individuals or groups that serve to provide order to the world (e.g., Allport, 1954). This
categorization also serves a self-protective function in which downward comparison
increases personal feelings of self worth and value (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). According to
TMT, thoughts of death should elicit increased use of these categorizations because they
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provide self-affirming feelings of meaningfulness and provide order to the universe
(Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996). Supporting evidence
finds that Christians attribute more negative stereotypic traits toward a Jewish target after
mortality salience (Greenberg et al., 1990). Similarly, United States college students
make more stereotypic personality trait ratings of Germans when thoughts of death are
primed compared to control conditions (Schimel et al., 1999).
Mortality salience not only increases stereotype activation, but it also influences
with whom participants identify. Thoughts of death increase identification with, and
favorability toward, similar others and concordantly decrease identification with and
favorability toward those who are dissimilar (e.g., Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski,
Solomon, & Chatel, 1992; see Greenberg et al., 1997 for review). For example, White
participants identify with and demonstrate more sympathy toward a White racist
advocating White pride vs. an African American racists advocating Black pride after
mortality salience compared to those experiencing control conditions, who are more
sympathetic toward the African American racist (Greenberg, Schimel, Martens, Solomon,

& Pyszczynski, 2001).
Schimel et al. ( 1999) suggests that the mere existence of dissimilar world views
threatens an individual's faith in his or her own personal world views, enacting negative
behaviors and attitudes (i.e., prejudice, hostility, and derogation) toward those who hold
worldview-threatening views. From this perspective one should like an individual who
acts according to one's cultural worldview and dislike those who threaten this worldview
(Greenberg et al., 1990). Rosenblatt et al. (1989) tested this general hypothesis by
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presenting college students, and in a later study actual judges, with a case of an alleged
prostitute, finding that mortality salience increased subsequent bail bond
recommendations from both students and judges alike. An increased awareness of death
can make even those prized for impartialness (i.e., judges) adhere more strictly to their
cultural worldviews of morality.
If thoughts of death lead to increased preferences for worldview-validating
information, resulting in lower evaluations of worldview-threatening targets (Greenberg
et al., 1990), increased in-group identification (Dechesne, Janssen, et al., 2000), and
increased stereotype activation (Schimel et al., 1999), then it is logical to assume that
mortality salience would cause participants to prefer a stereotype-consistent target (i.e., a
worldview-validating target) over a stereotype-inconsistent target (i.e., a worldviewthreatening target). To test this hypothesis, Schimel et al. had participants read essays
about three African American students' summer vacations and rate their attitudes toward
each after a mortality salience prime or a similarly matched control condition. The race of
the target and the stereotype-consistency of targets' essays were manipulated, resulting in
four conditions: African American stereotype-consistent, African American stereotypeinconsistent, African American neutral, and White neutral. Control participants preferred
the stereotype inconsistent African American student (i.e., a worldview-threatening
target) over the stereotype-consistent. After MS, however, participants preferred the
stereotype-consistent African American (i.e., a worldview-validating target) over the
stereotype inconsistent African American.
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Subsequent studies replicated these findings by manipulating the stereotypicality
of applicants for two gender stereotypical jobs (Study 4) and the stereotypicality of a
homosexual male (Study 5). Participants preferred a worldview-validating target after
mortality salience, demonstrating significantly lower ratings of the worldviewthreatening target (i.e., the stereotype inconsistent target). Control conditions preferred
the worldview-threatening target and rated the worldview-validating target significantly
lower in favorability ratings. Interestingly, Study 5 also included a measure of NFC and
found that the increased preference for a worldview-validating target in mortality salience
conditions was moderated by NFC, with only those high in NFC demonstrating this
preference. Those low in NFC were unaffected by mortality salience, and generally rated
the stereotype-consistent target more positively than the stereotype-inconsistent target.
These findings imply that people high in NFC prefer a target who confirms their cultural
worldviews when death is salient, regardless of the specific stereotype content. Any
information that validates an individual's cultural world views helps them to deal with the
anxiety associated with thoughts of death, especially in people who score high in NFC.
Current Study
Mortality salience can increase stereotypic thinking (Schimel et al., 1999, Study
1), identification with an in-group (Arndt et al., 2002; Dechesne et al., 2003), and
preferences for a stereotype confirming individual (Schimel et al., Study 3, 4, & 5), but
there has been very little research examining the implications of these findings. There are
only a handful of studies linking TMT with explicit behaviors, such as derogation or
aggression toward those who threaten this stereotypic worldview (Dechesne, Janssen, et
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al., 2000, McGregor et al., 1998). McGregor et al. assessed aggression by measuring how
much hot sauce participants gave targets, finding that mortality salience caused increased
aggression toward a worldview-threatening target. Interestingly, further studies (Study 2
& 3) suggest that that derogation and aggression may serve the same terror management
function in that participants either derogated or demonstrated aggression toward a
worldview-threatening target depending on which opportunity was presented first. If
participants were first given a chance to derogate the target, there were no differences in
hot sauce allocation. If they were first given the chance to give the target hot sauce
however, they did not derogate the threat.
Although hostility may be one response to these worldview-threats, Solomon et
al. (2004) suggest that thoughts of death can also lead to avoidance of a worldviewthreatening target, especially for participants high in NFC. The only research to date
linking TMT and avoidance found that mortality salience primes caused German
participants to sit closer to a German confederate who validated their cultural worldview
and further from a Turkish confederate who criticized their worldviews (i.e., criticized
participants' nationality; Ochsman & Mathy, 1994, as cited in Solomon et al., 2004).
Although this study could be interpreted as demonstrating avoidance of a worldviewthreatening target, it could also be interpreted as demonstrating increased in-group
identification. Participants could merely have been identifying with a fellow German who
advocated similar views (i.e., an in-group member) and thus sitting further from a
Turkish confederate advocating dissimilar views (i.e., indicative of an out-group
member).
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Mortality salience can cause any number of behavioral and attitudinal effects such
as derogation (Dechesne, Janssen, et al., 2000), aggression (McGregor et al., 1998), and
increased in-group identification (Greenberg et al., 2000). More importantly to the
current study, thoughts of death have led to increased favorability toward a worldviewvalidating out-group member and decreased favorability toward a worldview-threatening
out-group member (Schimel et al., 1999).
Avoidance may, in fact, be related to this type of decreased favorability. White
participants avoided interacting with an African American confederate after observing
another African American confederate act negatively (e.g., hostile), and this avoidance
was reflective of participants' negative attitudes (Henderson-King & Nisbett, 1996). In
fact, avoidant behavior is most likely to occur toward a disliked target (Kuppens, Van
Mechelen, & Meulders, 2004). These findings suggest that negative attitudes or
preferences are related to avoidant behaviors. Together with literature on TMT, these
findings suggest that thoughts of death will create a decreased preference or favorability
toward a worldview-threatening target, and this preference could then lead to avoidance.
However, no published study to date has explicitly tested whether mortality salience will
lead to increased avoidance of a world view-threatening target. For the purposes of the
current study, avoidance is operationalized as the intentional and purposeful lack of or
decrease in interaction with a specific individual. The current research is intended to
demonstrate that mortality salience increases participants' need for worldview validation
and efforts to maintain these worldviews, leading to avoidance of a worldviewthreatening target through social exclusion.
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Cyberball (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000) is a computer simulated game of
catch used to manipulate feelings of social exclusion. Ostracism through cyberball creates
the same feelings of social exclusion as demonstrated in previous research paradigms
such as physical ball tossing (Williams et al., 2000, Williams et al., 2002), or imagining
life alone (Baumeister, Twenger, & Nuss, 2002; Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004).
Although no published studies have yet used cyberball as a dependent measure, this
paradigm is ideal for measuring avoidance, assuming tossing behavior is indicative of
intentional interaction. Through the use of cyberball, interactions can be completely
controlled without the use of confederates, whose individual characteristics can introduce
confounds into a study. The computer program tells the individual who is throwing and
receiving. Number of tosses, both to the participant and to other targets, can be controlled
by the experimenter. Participants can choose to whom to throw by selecting the picture
associated with the player, and the program records tosses to and from each target
(Williams, 2007; Williams & Jarvis, 2006).
In accordance with terror management theory and previous research, the current
study will test the following hypotheses.
Hl.

After MS, participants will toss the ball more frequently to the stereotype
consistent target than the stereotype inconsistent target.

H2.

After MS, participants will rate the stereotype consistent target higher on
both attitude and trait favorability measures than the stereotype
inconsistent and neutral targets.
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H3.

The effects of MS will be moderated by participants' need for closure;
only those high in NFC will be significantly affected by MS in frequency
of tosses and favorability ratings. Participants low in NFC will be
unaffected by MS.

H4.

In the control conditions, participants will toss the ball more to, and have
an increased preference for, the stereotype inconsistent target.
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CHAPTER2
METHOD
A Priori Effect Size
Effect sizes from similar studies conducted by Schimel et al. (1999, studies 3, 4,
& 5) had an average Cohen's d effect size index of .74 whereas studies from McGregor et
al. (1998) using aggression measures had an average effect size of .46. For the purposes
of this study, a more conservative effect size estimate was used of .40. A priori power
analysis suggested that a sample size of at least 168 would be necessary to achieve a
power of .95 in the current study.
Participants and Design
Two-hundred psychology students from a Midwestern university (Mage= 18.68,

SD= 1.15; 143 females, 57 males) were randomly assigned to experimental conditions in
a 2 (condition: death vs. dental pain) X 3 (target: stereotype consistent vs. stereotype
inconsistent vs. neutral) mixed design in exchange for course credit.
Procedure
The White male experimenter greeted each participant individually and instructed
him or her to sit at a desk equipped with a computer. The experimenter then stated, in
correspondence with the cover story, that this was a cooperative study with another
graduate student from Tennessee State University entitled "Impression formation" in
which they would be interacting with three other students from UNI or TSU via the
internet. The experimenter further explained that the intent of this study was to assess
how people perceive others from very minimal information, and how these perceptions
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change with interaction. In addition, the experimenter instructed participants that this
study would also examine whether people's perceptions of how they are perceived by
others is congruent with actual perceptions by others, and whether interaction increases
the accuracy of these self-perceived impressions.
After acquiring consent, the experimenter explained that a pivotal part of first
impressions are people's reactions to how others look, thus requiring a picture to be taken
of each participant. The experimenter took a picture of each participant and instructed
him or her to begin the experiment by clicking "start" on the computer screen. The
experimenter then left the room, supposedly to upload the picture. All further instructions
(

and measures were administered via the computer.
Each participant first wrote a short essay describing his or her summer (see
Appendix A) under the guise that these descriptions would be circulated among
participants. The instructions informed participants that their picture, along with their
essay, was the only information available for the other students to create a first
impression. In congruence with the cover story, participants rated themselves using an
attitude and trait questionnaire as they thought the other students would perceive them
from only the information they have provided. Participants then completed four
"personality" measures, including need for closure (Kruglanski et al., 1993), the mortality
attitudes personality survey about death or dental pain (Rosenblatt et al., 1989), the
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule - Expanded form (Watson & Clark, 1994), and an
opinion questionnaire on "The Growing Stone" taken from Albert Camus's Exile and the

Kingdom (I 957, as cited in Greenberg et al., 1994).
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Rosenblatt et al. 's (1989) Mortality Attitudes Personality survey (see Appendix
B) consists of a set of open-ended questions about mortality or dental pain and was used
as the manipulation of mortality salience. Experimental conditions were instructed to:
"Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you"
and "Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you
physically die and once you are physically dead." Control conditions were given two
similar questions regarding dental pain, stating "Please briefly describe the emotions that
the thought dental pain arouses in you" and "Jot down, as specifically as you can, what
you think will happen to you as you experienc<t dental pain and once you have physically
experienced dental pain" (Greenberg et al., 1994; Schimel et al., 1999).
After completion of these measures, participants read three fictitious students'
summer descriptions that were modified to be stereotypically consistent, neutral, or
inconsistent with prevalent American stereotypes of African Americans. Descriptions
were based on Schimel et al. (1999, study 3) and were modified for believability (see
Appendix C). Modifications of essays were based on media portrayals of African
Americans and were intended to utilize the most prevalent American stereotypes of
African Americans such as "unintelligent," "musical," "promiscuous," and "athletic"
(Devine & Elliott, 1995). The stereotype inconsistent description was presented with no
colloquialisms or grammatical errors and stated that the target spent the summer working
for a software company while taking summer classes. The neutral description referred to
spending the summer as a lifeguard, hanging out with friends, watching movies, and
playing video games. The stereotype consistent description referred to spending the
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summer playing basketball and enjoying the nightlife. This description incorporated
stereotypic slang along with nonstandard grammar such as "me and my boyz," "lookin
for honies," and getting "crunked." Each description was presented in association with
one of three pictures of African American males. Descriptions were presented in the same
order (i.e., stereotype inconsistent, neutral, stereotype consistent) while the pictures
associated with each description were presented in a counterbalanced order. Pictures
consisted of three standard headshots of smiling African American males in front of a
blue background (courtesy of Dr. Christian Meissner, UTEP; see Appendix D).
After advancing to the next page, participants then played a game called cyberball
(Williams et al., 2000) with the three targets under the belief that these were actual
students. Cyberball (see Appendix E) is played on a computer in which participants are
included in a game of catch (see Williams et al., 2000 for review). Participants choose
who to throw to by selecting the picture of the player (Williams et al.). The program was
set to toss the ball to the participant 43% of the time. The instructions to the game told
participants not to focus on actually throwing or catching the ball, but to use the game to
assist in visualizing the other players and what they are like. After agreeing that they had
read and understood the instructions, participants played cyberball for a duration of 60
tosses. Participants then completed items assessing perceived frequency of ball tosses to
the three fictitious students and rated their attitudes toward these individuals and
themselves using similar trait and attitude questionnaires to those used previously. As
manipulation checks, participants also indicated the race of each student and rated how
stereotypic each student was on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from (1) not at all
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stereotypical to (6) extremely stereotypical. Once completed, the experimenter came back
into the room, probed the participant for suspicion, thoroughly debriefed him or her, and
then thanked each participant for his or her time.
Measures
Need for Closure
Need for closure (a= .85; see Appendix F) was assessed using a 42-item scale in
which participants rated their level of agreement on a 6-point Likert scale with statements
such as: "I think that having clear rules and order to work is essential for success" and "I
enjoy having a clear and structured mode oflife." The scale is intended to assess an
individual's cognitive need for closure and avoidance of ambiguity. Previous research has
found this measure to be highly reliable with a Cronbach's alpha of .84 and test-retest
reliability of .86 (Kruglanski et al., 1993). This measure demonstrates acceptable
convergent and discriminant validity, being slightly correlated with authoritarianism (r =
.27), intolerance of ambiguity (r = .29), dogmatism (r = .29), impulsivity (r = .27), the
fear of invalidity scale (r = -.21 ), need for cognition (r = -.28), and IQ (r = -.17) and is
not correlated with the Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability scale (r = -.02; Webster &
Kruglanski, 1994; see Kruglanski et al., 1997 for review).
PANAS-X
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule- Expanded form (see Appendix G)
has participants rate themselves on 60 trait items such as "cheerful," "bold," "at ease,"
and "energetic" on a 5-point Likert scale from not at all (1) to extremely (5; Watson &
Clark, 1994). This measure has eleven affective subscales consisting of fear (a = .82),
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hostility (a= .80), guilt (a= .82), sadness (a= .79), joviality (a= .90), self assurance (a
= . 75), attentiveness (a = .65), shyness (a = .85), fatigue (a = .79), serenity (a = .77), and
surprise (a= .69), along with two higher order scales consisting of positive and negative
affect (a's = .80, .85, respectively). This scale has a test-retest reliability ranging from .59
to. 71 on the higher order scales and has convergent correlations with six scales from the
Profile of Mood States (POMS) ranging from .85 to .91, suggesting relatively strong
construct validity. The PANAS-X also demonstrates moderately strong internal
discriminant validity between scales, with coefficients ranging from -.05 to -.35 between
positive affect scales and negative affect scales (see Watson & Clark for review).
The Growing Stone
A short excerpt was taken from "the Growing Stone," from the collection Exile
and the Kingdom by Albert Camus (1957, as cited in Greenberg et al., 1994; see
Appendix H). This excerpt is commonly used in the literature as a distraction task
because of its neutral affective tone and lack ofreferences to death (Greenberg et al.,
1994). After reading the excerpt, participants indicated how descriptive the excerpt was
on a 6-point Likert scale and whether they thought the author was male or female.
Attitude and Trait Measures
The measure evaluating participants' attitudes toward themselves and targets (a's

> .81 ; see Appendix I) consisted of 7 statements such as "I think I would like this
person," and "I am interested in getting to know this person," which participants rated on
6-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree ( 1) to strongly agree (6; Schimel et
al., 1999). Participants identified the three different targets by their picture, which was
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located above each attitude measure. Self-rated attitude measures were changed slightly
(e.g., "I think people will say that I'm a nice person," "I think people will say they would
be interested in getting to know me").
Participants also rated themselves and targets on 12 traits (as> .71) consisting of
"intelligent," "conceited," "nice," "arrogant," "antisocial," "trustworthy," "hostile,"
"hardworking," "athletic," "friendly," "freeloader," and "productive" on 6-point Likert
scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (extremely) using the same methodology listed
above (Schimel et al., 1999). These items remained the same for self-ratings.
Percent of Tosses
Number of tosses to each target was measured via cyberball. Percent of tosses to
each target was calculated by dividing participants' frequency of tosses to each target by
their total number of tosses.
Perceived Frequency of Ball Tosses
Participants rated how often they received the ball from each student and how
often they threw the ball to each student, identified by his or her picture, on a scale from
0-100% of the time (see Appendix J).
Manipulations Check
Participants indicated the race of each target and rated how stereotypical each
target was for his or her race on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all
stereotypical) to 6 (very stereotypical). Participants also rated how similar each target

was on a similar 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all similar) to 6 (very
similar). Targets were identified by their picture at the top of the page (see Appendix K).
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CHAPTER3
RESULTS
Excluded Data
Seventeen participants were excluded due to their race (only data from
Caucasians were used) and an additional five for incorrectly identifying the race of the
targets. Of the remaining 178 participants, 26 displayed suspicion as to the true nature of
the study during debriefings. Analyses conducted with and without these participants

"
demonstrated similar trends; thus these 26 suspicious participants were included in all
further analyses to conserve power. Due to technical problems associated with cyberball,
11 of the remaining 178 participants' frequency of ball tosses data were not recorded;
however, their data were used in all other analyses.
Manipulation Checks
Consistent with previous research (Greenberg et al., 1994; Schimel et al., 1999), a
one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOV A) on the 11 affective subscales of
the PANAS-X found that mortality salience had no effects on mood (Fs < 2.55).
Repeated measures t-tests were used to determine the stereotypicality of the
targets. The stereotype consistent target was rated as more stereotypical (M = 4.27, SD=
1.23) than both the neutral target (M= 2.50, SD= 1.05), t(l 74) = 15.72,p < .001, d=
2.40, and the stereotype inconsistent target (M= 2.01, SD= .86), t(l 74) = 20.17,p < .001,
d = 3.08. Consistent with expectations, the stereotype inconsistent target was rated as
being less stereotypical than the neutral target, t(l 74) = 6.93,p < .001, d= 1.06.
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Hypothesis Tests
· Percent of Ball Tosses
ANCOV A. To avoid problems with multicollinearity, only the percent of tosses
to the stereotype consistent and stereotype inconsistent targets were used. Percent of ball
tosses were then analyzed using a 2 (condition: death vs. dental pain) X 2 (target:
stereotype consistent vs. stereotype inconsistent) X 2 (need for closure: high vs. low,
based on a median split) mixed ANCOV A. An initial analysis included age, political
\-

orientation, family socioeconomic status (SES), current SES, and sex as covariates 1•
Because the first four variables had no effect on the results (ps > .14), the analysis was rerun using sex as the only covariate.
There was a significant main effect of target, F(l, 162) = 6. 97, p = . 01, 112 = . 04, in
which participants tossed the ball more to the stereotype inconsistent target than the
stereotype consistent target (see Figure 1). Contrary to predictions, mortality salience did
2

not affect participants' tossing behaviors, F(l, 162) = .002,p = .97, 11 < .01. The twoway interaction of target by condition was not significant, F(l, 162) = .51,p = .48, 11 2 <
.01 (see Figure 2).
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Figure 1. Percent of tosses as a function of target stereotypicality.
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Figure 2. Percent of ball tosses as a function of condition and stereotypicality.
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The main effect of NFC was not significant, F(l, 162) = .05,p = .83, 11 2 < .01.
Contrary to predictions, the two-way interaction of target by level of NFC was not
significant, F(l, 162) = .01,p = .93, 11 2 < .01. Similarly, the three-way interaction of
condition by target by NFC was not significant, F(l, 162) = 2.54,p = .11, 112 = .02 (see
Table 1). Neither mortality salience, NFC, nor their interactions had a significant effect
on percent of ball tosses.

Table 1

Cell Means for the Three-Way Need for Closure X Condition X Stereotypicality
Interaction on Percent of Ball Tosses.
Need For Closure
High
Control

MS
Target
Stereotype consistent
Stereotype
inconsistent
Note. n = 167

Low
MS

Control

Madj

SE

Madj

SE

Madj

SE

Madj

SE

.34

.01

.31

.01

.32

.01

.33

.01

.33

.01

.35

.01

.35

.01

.34

.01

Regression Analysis. Because of problems with using a median split, three
hierarchical regressions were also used to determine whether NFC moderated the effects
of mortality salience. Need for closure was standardized into z-scores to avoid problems
with multicolinearity among variables as outlined by Frazier, Tix, and Barron (2004; for
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further explanation see Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) and for ease of
interpretation (Aiken & West, 1991). Percent of ball tosses to each target was predicted
using the standardized NFC, mortality salience, and their interaction as independent
variables. Sex, condition, and the standardized z-scores of NFC were all entered in the
first step, with the interaction of condition and the standardized NFC z-scores entered in

"

the second step. Contrary to hypotheses, neither NFC, MS, nor their interaction
significantly predicted percent of ball tosses (ps > .37; see Table 2).

Table 2

Multiple Regression Results: Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Changes
in R2 on Percent of Ball Tosses Controlling for Sex.
Percent of Tosses
Step and Predictor

Stereotype
Consistent

Neutral

Stereotype
Inconsistent

.04*
.01
-.00
.05
.03

-.04*
-.00
.00
.08
.06

.00
-.01
.00
.00
-.02

Step 1
Sex
MS
NFC

R2
Adjusted R2
Step 2

Sex
.04*
-.04*
.01
-.00
MS
-.01
.01
NFC
.01
-.01
MS X NFC
2
~R
.01
.00
2
R
.06
.08
Adjusted R2
.03
-.06
Note. Sex was coded as 1 (male), 0 (female), and MS was coded as 1 (MS),
*p< .05

.00
-.01
.00
-.01
.00
.01
-.02
0 (control);
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Attitudes
ANOVAS. Mean attitude ratings were computed for each target to determine
which target participants preferred. Data were analyzed using a 2 (mortality salience:
death vs. dental pain) X 3 (target: stereotype consistent ys. neutral vs. stereotype
inconsistent) X 2 (need for closure: high vs. low) mixed ANCOVA. An initial analysis
found that the covariates of age, political orientation, family SES, current SES and sex
had no effects on the results (ps > .43); therefore, they were removed from further
analysis to conserve power. Attitude favorability ratings mirrored the results of percent of
ball tosses; the main effect of condition and the two-way interaction of target by
condition were not significant (F(l, 174) = .14,p = .71, ri 2 < .01, F(2, 348) = .38,p = .68,

ri 2 < .01 respectively; see Figure 3). However, there was a significant main effect of
target, F(2, 348) = 127.87,p < .001, ri 2 = .47. Participants rated the neutral (Mactj = 4.61,

SE= .05) and stereotype inconsistent (Mactj = 4.71, SE= .05) targets more favorably than
the stereotype consistent target (Mactj = 3.72, SE= .07) regardless of condition, t(l 77) =
12.44,p < .001, d = 1.88, t(l 77) = 12.66,p < .001, d = 1.91, respectively (see Figure 4).
There was no difference between neutral and stereotype inconsistent targets in attitude
favorability ratings, t(l 77) = 1.89, p = .06, d = .28.
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Figure 3. Attitude ratings as a function of condition and target stereotypicality.
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Figure 4. Attitude favorability ratings as a function of target stereotypicality.
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The main effect of NFC was not significant, F(I, 174) = 1.56,p = .21, 11 2 = .01,
nor was the interaction of target by NFC, F(2, 348) = 1.14, p = .32, 112 = .01. The threeway interaction was also not significant, F(2, 348) = 2.91,p = .06, 11 2 = .02, suggesting
that neither MS, NFC, nor their interaction significantly affected participants' attitude
favorability ratings (see Table 3).

Table 3

Cell Means for the Three-Way Need for Closure X Condition X Stereotypicality
Interaction on Attitude Ratings.
Need For Closure
High
MS
Target

Low
Control

MS

Control

Madj

SE

Mactj

SE

Mactj

SE

Madj

SE

Stereotype
consistent

3.44

.14

3.79

.15

3.93

.15

3.73

.13

Neutral

4.58

.10

4.60

.10

4.58

.11

4.68

.09

4.67

.09

4.70

.10

4.79

.10

4.69

.09

Stereotype
inconsistent
Note. n = 178

Regression Analyses. Three hierarchical regressions were used to determine
whether NFC moderated the effects of mortality salience on attitude favorability using
similar procedures as described for analysis of percent of ball tosses. Need for closure
explained a significant proportion of variance in attitude scores toward the stereotype
consistent target, R2 = .06, F(l, 174) = 3.59,p = .02. Although NFC did not moderate
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attitude favorability ratings for the neutral or stereotype inconsistent targets, there was a
significant interaction of condition by NFC in attitude ratings toward the stereotype

"

consistent target, B = -.34, t(I 74) = 2.43,p = .02, jj.R 2 = .03, /j.F(l, 174) = 5.92,p = .02
(see Table 4).
Two more hierarchical regressions controlling for MS condition were used to
determine how NFC moderated the effects of mortality salience on attitude favorability
toward the stereotype consistent target (Baron & Kenny, 1986). In the mortality salience
condition, participants scoring higher in NFC rated the stereotype consistent target less
favorably, B

= -.33, t(83) = 3.31,p = .001, and NFC explained a significant proportion of

the variance in favorability, R2 = .11, F(l, 83) = 10.97,p = .001. Need for closure,
however, had no influence on attitude ratings toward the stereotype consistent target in
2

the control condition, B = .01, R < .0I,p = .92.
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Table 4

Multiple Regression Results: Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Changes
in R2 on Attitude Favorability Ratings.
Attitude ratings
Step and predictor

Stereotype
Consistent

Neutral

Stereotype
Inconsistent

-.06
-.15*
.03
.02

-.05
-.01
.00
-.01

.02
.02
.00
-.01

-.06
.01
-.34*
.03*
.06
.04

-.05
.02
-.05
.00
.00
-.01

.03
.05
-.06
.00
.00
-.01

Step 1
MS
NFC

R2
Adjusted R2
Step 2
MS
NFC
MSXNFC

~R2
R2
Adjusted R2
Note. * p < .05; n = 178

ANOVAS. Mean trait ratings were also computed to determine how positively
participants would rate each target and were analyzed using a 2 (mortality salience: death
vs. dental pain) X 3 (target: stereotype consistent vs. neutral vs. stereotype inconsistent)
X 2 (need for closure: high vs. low) mixed ANOVA. An initial analysis found that the
covariates of age, political orientation, family SES, current SES, and sex had no effects
on the results (ps > .06); therefore, they were removed from further analysis to conserve
power. The main effect of condition and the two-way interaction of target by condition
was not significant, F(l, 176) = 1.12,p = .29, 11

2

= .01, F(2, 348) = 1.37,p = .25, 11 2 = .01,
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respectively (see Figure 5). There was a significant main effect of target, F(2, 348) =

297.43,p < .001, 112 = .63, in which participants' trait ratings were more positive for the
stereotype inconsistent target (Mactj = 4.87, SE= .03) than the neutral target (Mactj = 4. 70,

SE= .04), t(I 77) = 5.19,p < .001, d = .78, and the stereotype consistent target (Mactj =
3.82, SE= .05), t(l 77) = 20.12,p < .001, d = 3.04 (see Figure 6). In fact, the stereotype
consistent target was rated the lowest, with significantly lower ratings than the neutral
target, t(I 77) = 17.61,p < .001, d = 2.66.
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Figure 5. Trait ratings as a function of condition and target stereotypicality.
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Stereotype Consistent

Neutral

Stereotype Inconsistent

Note. Values represent adjusted means. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
Scale ranged from 1 (Not at All) to 6 (Extremely). n = 178
Figure 6. Trait ratings as a function of target stereotypicality.

Further analyses determining whether NFC moderated the effects of mortality
salience on trait ratings of targets found similar results; the three-way interaction was not
significant F(2, 348) = .24,p = .79, 11 2 < .01 (see Table 5), nor was the interaction of
target by NFC, F(2, 348) = .69,p = .50, 112 < .01. The main effect of NFC was also not
significant F(l, 174) = .04,p = .83,, 112 < .01. Hierarchical regressions supported the
above results, finding that NFC did not moderate the effects of MS on trait ratings (ps >
.47; see Table 6).
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Table 5

Cell Means for the Three-Way Need for Closure X Condition X Stereotypicality
Interaction on Trait Ratings.
Need For Closure
High
MS

Low
Control

MS

Control

Target

Mactj

SE

Madj

SE

Madj

SE

Madj

SE

Stereotype
consistent

3.75

.09

3.85

.09

3.86

.10

3.80

.08

Neutral

4.76

.07

4.72

.08

4.72

.08

4.62

.07

4.92

.07

4.82

.07

4.95

.07

4.80

.06

Stereotype
inconsistent
Note. n = 178

Table 6

Multiple Regression Rg_sults: Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Changes
in R2 on Trait Favorability Ratings.
Trait ratings
Step and predictor

Stereotype
Consistent

Neutral

Stereotype
Inconsistent

-.01
-.07
.01
.00

.07
.03
.01
.00

.12
.02
.02
.01

-.01
-.04
-.07
.00
.02
-.00

.07
.06
-.05
.00
.01
-.00

.12
.03
-.02
.00
.02
.01

Step 1
MS
NFC

R2
Adjusted R2
Step 2
MS
NFC
MSXNFC

~R2
R2
Adjusted R2

Note. n = 178
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Exploratory Analyses
Self-Reported Avoidance
ANOV AS. Three items from the attitude favorability scales were combined ("I
would avoid this person," "I would not talk to this person," and "I would not interact with
this person") to create a self-reported avoidance index for each target (as > .75). A 2
(condition: death vs. dental pain) X 3 (target: stereotype consistent vs. neutral vs.
stereotype inconsistent) X 2 (need for closure: high vs. low, based on a median split)
mixed ANCOV A was then conducted utilizing this new avoidance index as the
dependent variable. Again, an initial analysis included age, political orientation, family
SES, current SES, and sex as covariates. None of the covariates were significant (ps >
.39) and the analysis was re-run without any covariates.
As with the behavioral measure, there was a significant main effect of target, F(2,

-

348) = 66.63,p < .001, 11 2 = .28, in which participants' ratings for avoidance were highest
for the stereotype consistent target (see Figure 7). Interestingly, MS and NFC did seem to
have marginal effects on these self-reported avoidance ratings. Participants tended to
have higher avoidance ratings toward all three targets in the mortality salience condition

(M= 2.19, SE= .07) compared to the control condition (M= 2.01, SE= .07), F(l, 174) =
2.81,p = .10, 11

2

= .02. Correspondingly, those who were categorized as high in NFC

tended to have higher avoidance ratings of all three targets (M = 2.20, SE= .07) than
those categorized as low in NFC (M= 2.00, SE= .07), F(l, 174) = 3.66,p = .06, 112 = .02.
However, none of the ensuing 2- or 3-way interactions were significant (ps > .16)
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Note. Values represent adjusted means. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
Scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). n = 178

Figure 7. Self-reported avoidance as a function of target.

Regression Analysis. Three hierarchical regressions were used to determine
whether NFC moderated the effects of mortality salience on this avoidance index. Need
for closure, MS, and their interaction had no significant effect on avoidance ratings
toward the neutral and stereotype inconsistent targets, ps > .28. However, the model
significantly predicted avoidance for the stereotype consistent target, F(3, 174) = 2.90,p
=

.04, but NFC did not moderate the effects of MS, B = .30, R2 = .05, 6F(l, 174) = 2.95,

p

= .05 (see Table 7)

f
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Table 7

Multiple Regression Results: Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Changes
in R 2 on Avoidance Ratings.
Trait ratings
Stereotype
Consistent

Neutral

Stereotype
Inconsistent

Adjusted R2

.16
.18
.03
.02

.21
.03
.02
.01

.18
-.04
.02
.00

MS
NFC
MSXNFC
t::,.R2
R2
AdjustedR2

.15
.05
.30
.02
.05
.03

.21
.02
.02
.00
.02
.01

.18
-.07
.06
.00
.02
-.00

Step and predictor
Step 1
MS
NFC
R2
Step2

Note. n = 178

Perceived Percentage of Tosses
Perceived percentage oftosses to each target were rather strongly correlated with
actual tosses, average within-cell r = .53,p < .001. Perceived percentage of ball tosses
were analyzed using a 2 (condition: death vs. dental pain) X 2 (target: stereotype
consistent vs. stereotype inconsistent) X 2 (need for closure: high vs. low, based on a
median split) mixed ANOV A. An initial analysis found that the covariates of age,
political orientation, family SES, current SES, and sex had no effects on the results (ps >
.15), and were removed from further analysis. The main effect of target was not
significant, F(l, 174) = 2.73,p = .10, 11 2 = .02. The main effects of condition and NFC
2
2
were also not significant, F(l, 174) < .01,p = .99, 11 < .01, F(l, 174) = .01,p = .93, 11 <

f
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.01, respectively. Similarly, the 2-way interactions of target by condition, and target by
NFC were not significant, F(l, 174) = .10,p = .75, 11 2 < .01, F(l, 174) = .69,p = .41, 11 2 <
.01, respectively. The 3-way interaction was also not significant, F(I, 174) = .17,p = .68,
112<.0l.
Sex Differences
Interestingly, there was a marginally significant interaction of target by sex on
observed percentage of ball tosses when sex was a covariate, F(l, 162) = 3.53,p = .06, 112

= .02. Independent samples t-tests indicated that there were significant sex differences in
percent of tosses to the stereotype consistent target, t(165) = 2.72,p < .01, d = .43, in
which men tossed the ball more to the stereotype consistent target than women (see
Figure 8). However, there were no significant sex differences in percentage of tosses to
the stereotype inconsistent target, t(I65) = .06,p = .95, d= .01.
To determine whether the sex difference was due to men throwing the ball more
often to the stereotype consistent target or women throwing the ball less often to that
target, I compared men's and women's percent of tosses to each target to chance (33%)
using one-sample t-tests. Men did not differ from chance in tossing behavior toward the
stereotype consistent or stereotype inconsistent targets, ps > .21. However, women tossed
the ball to the stereotype inconsistent and neutral targets significantly more often than
would be expected by chance, t(l 17) = 2.42, p = .02, d = .45, t(l 17) = 2.81, p < .01, d =
.52 respectively. They also tossed the ball to the stereotype consistent target significantly
less often than would be expected by chance, t(l 17) = 2.95,p < .01, d = .55.
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Independent samples !-tests also indicated sex differences in attitude favorability
toward the stereotypic target, t(l 76) = 2.27, p = .03, d = .34. Men tended to have higher
attitude favorability ratings for the stereotype consistent target than women (see Figure
9). However, there were no significant sex differences for the neutral or stereotype
inconsistent targets (ps > .25). Interestingly, there were no sex differences in trait ratings
for any of the three targets .
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Figure 8. Percent of tosses as a function of participants' sex and target stereotypicality.
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Figure 9. Attitude favorability as a function of participants' sex and target
stereotypicality.

Similarity Ratings
Multiple paired samples t-tests were conducted on participants' similarity ratings
toward each target. The stereotype inconsistent (M= 3.18, SD= 1.03) target had higher
similarity ratings than the stereotype consistent target (M = 2.13, SD = 1.03, t(l 76) =
9.18,p < .001, d= 1.38. The neutral target (M= 3.54, SD= 1.04), however, was rated as
the most similar, having significantly higher similarity ratings than both the stereotype
consistent, t(l 76) = 13 .62, p < .001, d = 2.05, and the stereotype inconsistent targets,
t(175)

= 3.53,p < .01, d= .53.

Self-Ratings
A 2 (mortality salience: death vs. dental pain) X 3 (time: pre vs. post) X 2 (need
for closure: high vs. low) mixed ANOV A was used to determine whether MS affected
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attitudinal self-ratings. There was a significant main effect of time, indicating that
participants had higher attitudinal self-ratings at the beginning of the study compared to
the end, F(l, 174) = 49.11,p < .001, 11 2 = .22 (see Figure 10). However, MS and NFC
seemed to have no effect on these attitude ratings. The main effects of condition and NFC
were not significant, F(l, 174) = .88,p = .35112= .01, F(l,174) = 1.97,p = .16, 1,2= .01,
· respectively. Similarly, the three-way interaction and both two-way interactions were not
significant (ps > .34 ).
Self-ratings on trait items also showed a significant main effect of time, which
indicated that participants rated themselves lower on trait ratings at the beginning of the
study compared to the end, F(l, 174) = 11.43,p < .01, 112 = .06 (see Figure 10). Again,
MS and NFC had no effect on these ratings as indicated by the lack of significance in
their main effects, F(l, 174) = 1.14,p = .29, 11
respectively, and their interactions (ps > .78).

2= .01, F(l, 174) = 2.15,p = .14, 112= .01
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CHAPTER4
DISCUSSION
Overall Findings
Although previous research has demonstrated that Caucasian participants'
preference for stereotype confirming information may be influenced by mortality salience
, (Schimel et al., 1999), this study demonstrated that the effects of mortality salience may
not be as pervasive as once speculated. Mortality salience did not cause participants to
avoid a stereotype threatening target as measured by their frequency of tosses, nor did it
affect participants' preferences. In fact, in this study, mortality salience had little to no
effects on participants whatsoever.
Participants threw the ball more often to the stereotype inconsistent target than the
stereotype consistent target regardless of mortality salience or need for closure (NFC).
Participants also preferred the stereotype-inconsistent target in both attitude and trait
ratings, demonstrating a similar trend to their tossing preferences. There are several
reasons why this might have occurred. Schimel et al. (1999) found that participants had a
preference for a stereotype inconsistent target in control conditions, where death was not
primed. Terror management theory's basic postulate is that worldview validation is a
distal defense enacted when thoughts of death are not in immediate focal attention,
requiring the use of distraction tasks (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, et al., 1997).
However, thoughts of death do not stay on one's mind forever. This decay suggests that
the effects of mortality salience are limited to a specific duration of time, creating the
possibility that the distraction tasks used in this study may have taken too long.
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Participants played cyberball approximately 10 after the MS prime, making it possible
that behaviors and attitudes were assessed after participants had already dealt with the
unconscious awareness of their own mortality. The fact that the results of attitude and
trait ratings, assessed even later in the study, mirrored the results of toss percentage data,
provide further support for the possibility that thoughts of death were no longer primed
' when participants were playing cyberball. However, the distraction tasks employed in
this study were the exact same as those in previous research (Greenberg et al., 1994;
Schimel et al., 1999), suggesting that thoughts of death should have been primed.
Explicitness of Cyberball
Assuming thoughts of death were primed, it is also possible that cyberball and the
act of playing catch with three other individuals may have been too explicit. Previous
research using very similar methodologies to the current study have demonstrated that
mortality salience causes participants to derogate or even aggress toward a worldviewthreatening target (e.g., McGregor et al., 1998). However, the methodologies used in
these studies allowed participants to remain anonymous, assessing derogation through
written critiques of essays (Dechesne, Janssen, et al., 2000) or aggression through
allocation of hot sauce to a target in another room (McGregor et al.). Research in the
aggression literature commonly finds that people are more likely to be aggressive when
they are anonymous or in states of deindividuation (Zimbardo, 2004). Perhaps cyberball
was too explicit a measure and participants felt identifiable. In the paradigm, participants
were led to believe that their picture acted as an identifier for the other students to choose
to whom to throw. This lack of anonymity may have caused participants to be influenced
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by social desirability, making them more likely to attempt to equally distribute tosses to
all targets and therefore negating any measurable effects of mortality salience.
Evidence from self-reported avoidance ratings, however, suggests that the
explicitness of cyberball was not an issue. The self-reported avoidance indices computed
from attitude favorability measures were congruent with overt behavior. Participants
·· reported higher avoidance ratings toward the stereotype consistent target than the neutral
or stereotype inconsistent target, and these ratings were unaffected by mortality salience.
Perceived percentage of tosses demonstrated a similar pattern and was not affected by
mortality salience. However, these toss percentage estimations were highly correlated
with actual percentage of tosses to each target, suggesting that participants may have
simply been honestly estimating how often they tossed the ball to each target. Together,
the results of these two extra measures suggest that anonymity may not have been a
major issue with the study. However, it should be noted that these measures were not
intended to be dependent measures and were not placed at times that would be optimally
affected by mortality salience, and thus may not be adequate measures of avoidance in
relation to thoughts of death.
Worldview-Threats and TMT
Another possibility explaining why mortality salience had little to no effect on
results deals with how people generally react to worldview-threats after mortality
salience. Research in TMT finds that participants will either derogate or aggress toward a
worldview-threat, depending on which option comes first (McGregor et al., 1998). This
differential usage suggests that derogation or aggression has a cathartic effect in regard to
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worldview validation. In regard to the current study, participants may have differentially
interacted with targets at the beginning of the game and later changed behavior as
negative attitudes toward the worldview-threat decreased. However, the patterns of tosses
in the data do not suggest that participants differentially preferred any of the targets at
the beginning of the sessions compared to the end. In fact, participants generally tended

to toss the ball to targets in a circular pattern throughout sessions.
As stated previously, there is a strong possibility that death may have no longer
been primed when participants were given the attitude and trait ratings toward targets due
to the duration of time that elapsed after the mortality salience prime. These measures
were taken approximately 15-20 minutes after the death prime, whereas previous
literature suggests that distraction tasks should take approximately 3-5 minutes (T.
Pyszczynski personal communication, October 2, 2008). However, there is evidence that
mortality salience did still have an effect even after this extensive time span. According
to regression analyses predicting attitude favorability, need for closure moderated the
effects of mortality salience on attitude ratings toward the stereotype consistent target,
suggesting that death may have still been primed when completing attitude and trait
measures. Participants high in need for closure rated the stereotype consistent target less
positively, but only in the mortality salience condition. Participants in the control
condition were unaffected and demonstrated no preference.
This finding, that MS decreased favorability toward a worldview-validating
target, is in direct contradiction with hypotheses and previous findings in the TMT
literature that have demonstrated that mortality salience increases preferences for
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stereotype confirming information, and that this preference is generally seen only in those
high in need for closure. However, this single finding may actually demonstrate that
mortality salience did cause participants to prefer a worldview confirming target.
Mortality salience may have caused participants to prefer a target that confirmed their
moral values (i.e., validated their worldviews of morality). Rosenblatt et al. (1989)
· demonstrated that people prefer information that is congruent with their moral values
after mortality salience and subsequently demonstrated that these values influenced
sentencing of an alleged prostitute. Perhaps the descriptions used to manipulate
stereotypicality primed moral values in participants, causing them to differentiate targets
by their consistency with participants' own moral values instead of consistency with
stereotypes.
In support of this moral values possibility, there was a significant sex difference
in percentage of ball tosses and attitude favorability in which men seemed to prefer and
toss the ball more to a stereotype consistent target than women did. Again, this preference
in tossing behavior could be due to the manipulation of stereotypicality. The stereotype
consistent target spoke of women as objects and was presented as being more
promiscuous than the neutral and stereotype inconsistent targets. Because of the way in
which the stereotype consistent target was represented, specifically in regard to attitudes
and behaviors toward women, women may have reacted even more harshly toward the
stereotype consistent target than men.
An alternative explanation for the observed sex difference in tossing behavior
may be related to each sex's general use and need for stereotypes. Men are generally
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higher in social dominance orientation, which is characterized by attitudes that endorse
inequality in favor of one's in-group (Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994). In fact, Sidanius
et al. state that "SDO is conceptually and empirically related to beliefs and attitudes such
as racism, nationalism, and political conservatism" (p. 999). One possibility is that men
may have preferred and tossed the ball more to the stereotype consistent target than
· women because of this endorsement of stereotypical beliefs that would coincide with
their world view. However, comparisons showed that women were the only participants to
be significantly impacted by the targets' stereotypicality, throwing to the stereotype
consistent target less often and the stereotype inconsistent target more often than
expected by chance. This finding further supports the hypothesis that perhaps women
were responding to the content of the stereotype consistent description.
Self Ratings
Interestingly, analysis of self ratings found that both attitude and trait self-ratings
were significantly different from pre-interaction to post, but not in the same direction.
Attitude ratings decreased after playing cyberball, but trait ratings actually increased.
These self-ratings were not affected by mortality salience, suggesting that some other
variable influenced attitude and trait ratings differentially. It is important to note that
participants were instructed to complete these measures as they thought the other
fictitious students would rate them. Perhaps being exposed to the three out-group targets
influenced self-perceptions out of comparison. Attitude ratings were framed in a more
behavioral context (e.g., "I think this person would be interested in socializing with me").
Perhaps after discovering that all three targets were African American, participants felt
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like more of an out-group member due to their race thus influencing participants' self
judgments negatively.
Participants rated themselves more positively on generally stable trait dimensions
after interacting with the three targets, suggesting that they did feel better about
themselves after interaction. This increase in trait self-ratings could be the result of
· participants comparing themselves to the other three targets. However, in the context of
the questions asked, this conclusion seems inappropriate. Participants were rating
themselves as they thought the other students would rate them. Participants may have
thought that the other fictitious students would rate them higher because they were the
only White participant in the session, and stereotypes toward Whites are more commonly
positive rather than negative (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). Another possibility is that
due to being the only out-group member, participants may have had an increased need to
bolster self-esteem on these stable trait dimensions that are generally considered
dispositional, whereas lower scores on the attitude measures could be explained through
situational contexts (e.g., "all the other students were African American or dissimilar
from myself'). Due to the nature of the study, it is very difficult to determine why these
self ratings were differentially influenced.
Implications
Terror Management Theory
The results of this study demonstrate that the effects of mortality salience may not
be as omnipresent as once proposed. Previous literature suggesting that mortality salience
influences overt behavior such as derogation and aggression have never explicitly tested
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the theory in regard to avoidance of a worldview-threat. To date, there is only one
unpublished study that demonstrates that mortality salience causes participants to avoid a
worldview-threatening target (Ochsman & Mathy, 1994, as cited in Solomon et al.,
2004). Although this study could have very easily demonstrated avoidance of a
worldview-threat, it also could have merely demonstrated that mortality salience
· increased in-group identification, leading participants to sit closer to a fellow in-group
member.
The current study incorporated a measure to identify whether results were merely
an artifact of increased in-group identification. Although participants rated the stereotype
consistent target as the least similar to themselves and consequently tossed the ball less
often to this target in comparison to the other targets, the neutral target was rated as being
most similar. Participants threw the ball relatively equally to the stereotype inconsistent
and neutral target, suggesting that avoidance was not a result of increased in-group
identification.
Related to this increased in-group identification hypothesis, it could also be
argued that participants may have felt like more of an out-group member if they believed
the target was from another school (i.e., the target was not only a different race, but was
also from a different school). In the study, participants were told that the targets could be
from their school or a different one (Tennessee State University; TSU), and some may
have assumed that the African American targets were from Tennessee because of the
relatively low prevalence of African Americans at their school. However, chi square
analysis showed that only the neutral and stereotype consistent targets were categorized
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as being from TSU significantly more often than expected by chance2 suggesting that
behavioral and attitude preferences were not a result of increased in-group (i.e., school)
identification.

It could also be argued that if results were due to group identification, women
would be most affected because all targets were men, making women a double or even
'triple out-group member (i.e., the targets were not only African American and from
another school, but they were all a member of the other sex as well). However, as
discussed earlier, women were more discriminatory toward the targets based on their
perceived consistency with African American stereotypes, which further suggests that
participants' avoidant behavior was not related to group identification, but was in fact
directly influenced by the stereotypicality of the targets.
The results of this study also imply that attitudes (vs. behaviors) may be more
strongly influenced by mortality salience. Effect sizes are far greater in studies using
attitude measures (e.g., Schimel et al., 1999) than those using behavioral measures (e.g.,
McGregor et al., 1998). Although the current study failed to find significant effects of
mortality salience, effect sizes related to preferences and behavior toward each target
demonstrated a similar trend to that of previous research. The effect sizes were far greater
for attitude and self-report measures than for behavioral measures. This attitude-behavior
disparity further suggests that although mortality salience does influence attitudes and
behavior, the ramifications may be less pronounced than TMT would suggest (i.e.,
Solomon et al., 2004).
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Stereotypes and Prejudice
Interestingly, the results of this study demonstrate that people will attempt to
avoid interaction with, and report general dislike for, an African American who confirms
their stereotypes in comparison to an individual that discredits these stereotypes. This
differential avoidance results in two very different implications. First, this demonstrates
· that people will interact more with African Americans who are inconsistent with their
stereotypes, suggesting that prejudiced attitudes may not be strictly associated with an
African American's race, but to the extent he or she confirms those stereotypes. Research
on Dovidio and Gaertner' s (1998) Integrated Model of Racism suggests that political
conservatives, in particular, may use stereotypes to justify prejudice and report less
prejudice toward those targets who are less stereotypical (Harton & Nail, in press;
Harton, Wadian, Nguyen, & Nail, 2009; Nail, Harton, & Decker, 2003; also see
Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, & Kendrick, 1991).
The second, and more pessimistic, implication of this study suggests that avoiding
stereotypical African Americans will only perpetuate the problem. This avoidance may
result in actual social exclusion or feelings of social exclusion, which has its own
negative effects on the person being excluded. Social exclusion often evokes feelings of
distress in the person being ostracized and has been found to activate parts of the brain
associated with actual exposure to physical pain (Eisenberger, Lieverman, & Williams,
2003).Being excluded can increase hostility (Downey & Feldman, 1996; Downey,
Frietas, Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998; Feldman & Downey, 1994), reduce self-esteem
(Williams et al., 2000; Zadro et al., 2004), create social loafing (Williams & Sommer,
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1997), increase avoidance of social interactions that could result in further exclusion
(Downey & Feldman, 1996), and even impair cognitive performance on complex
cognitive tasks (Baumeister et al, 2002). Interestingly, research has found that these and
other effects of being socially excluded are unaffected by closeness to the group or by the
situation (Eisenberger et al., 2003; Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007). For example, people
· are just as distressed from being ostracized by a KKK member as an in-group or rival
out-group member (Gonsalkorale & Williams). The culmination of this research suggests
that being excluded or avoided can in fact make an individual act more "hostile," "lazy,"
and "unintelligent," possibly causing African Americans to demonstrate characteristics
that are consistent with the very stereotypes that are causing them to be avoided.
Limitations and Future Research
There are several limitations to this study that urge caution in interpreting the
effects (or lack of, in this case) of mortality salience on behavior. This study was
originally intended to incorporate a death thought accessibility measure (Greenberg,
Arndt, Schimel, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2001; Schimel et al., 2007) as a manipulation
check to determine whether mortality salience was actually primed. The measure consists
of20 word fragments, 6 of which can be completed with either a word associated or
unassociated with death. However, by writing words associated with death, death would
again be primed and another distraction task would be needed whereupon it would be
unclear whether death was primed at this second time. A follow up study, using this death
thought accessibility measure in place of the stereotypic descriptions, is necessary to
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determine whether thoughts of death were actually primed when participants read the
three targets' summer descriptions and is currently in progress (Wadian, 2009).
As mentioned earlier, cyberball may have itself been a limitation to the current
study. It may have not been sensitive enough of a measure to indicate avoidant behavior.
Although it has been demonstrated to be a realistic simulation of catch (Eisenberger et al.,
· 2003; Williams & Jarvis, 2006), it has yet to be used as a dependent measure in published
research. Similarly, people naturally do not want to ostracize others (Williams, 2007),
which suggests that hypothesizing that participants would ostracize or socially exclude a
worldview-threatening target may have been unrealistic and counter to people's natural
behavior.
The descriptions themselves may also have been a limitation to the study. As
suggested earlier, they ~ay have primed moral values or unduly influenced differential
preferences between the sexes, specifically in regard to the stereotype consistent
description. Schimel et al. (1999) had similar concerns, suggesting that participants were
reacting to the specific content of descriptions versus the overall stereotypicality. Further
studies, however, found converging evidence that their results were not dependent on
attitudes toward the stereotypic description (Schimel et al.). The current study, on the
other hand, did not find the same results as Schimel et al., again suggesting the need for
further study on explicit behaviors toward a worldview-threat.
Future research should attempt to determine the true duration of mortality
salience. It is well documented that mortality salience influences attitudes, but if
mortality salience only influences attitudes or behaviors for a limited amount of time
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under certain circumstance, how important is it in real life? Much research is needed on
explicit behaviors, along with in-depth meta-analyses including null research to better
understand the effects of mortality salience, when it occurs, and how much it actually
affects behavior.
Future research should also utilize other measures of avoidance, both explicit and
· implicit, that can allow participants anonymously to demonstrate avoidant behavior. As
an example, future research could use a methodology similar to Ochsman and Mathy's
(1994, as cited in Solomon et al., 2004), in which avoidance is measured by how close
participants sit to targets, as long as all targets are out-group members to determine
whether results were a product of avoidance of a worldview-threatening target or
increased in-group identification. Further research should also compare the use of explicit
behavioral measures in comparison to anonymous behavioral measures in regards to
TMT to determine if the results of the current study were due to the identifiability of
participants' actions.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the current study demonstrates that although previous research has
found that mortality salience can influence attitudes and anonymous behaviors, it does
not seem to influence overt behavior toward a worldview-threatening out-group member.
This finding suggests that death may not influence behavior and social interaction as
much as once assumed. On the other hand, stereotypes and target stereotypicality
definitely did affect attitudes and behaviors, which led to avoidance of a stereotypical
African American male target regardless of mortality salience. The overall findings
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suggest that it is not thoughts of death that seem to truly influence whom we avoid or
even prefer, but the degree to which they match our stereotypes.

62

FOOTNOTES
1

An additional analysis tested similarity (e.g., how similar participants felt the

target was to themselves) as a covariate. Similarity ratings did not have an effect on
percent of ball tosses,ps > .18. Similarity toward the stereotype consistent target had a
significant effect on favorability ratings, F(l, 122) = 29.98,p < .001, trait ratings, F(l,
'122) = 12.37,p = .001, and avoidance ratings F(l, 122) = 22.29,p < .001. However,
analyses conducted with and without this similarity rating toward the stereotype
consistent target demonstrated similar trends, and it was therefore left out of all analyses
to conserve power.
2

A chi-square analysis was conducted on participants' school affiliation

categorization of targets. Analyses suggests that only the stereotype consistent and
neutral targets were identified as being from TSU significantly more than chance,
=

-·

178) = 6.49,p = .01, x2 (1, N= 178) = 69.61,p < .001, respectively.

i' (1, N
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APPENDIX A
SUMMER DESCRIPTION QUESTIONNAIRE
Please write a paragraph describing what you did last summer.
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APPENDIXB

MORTALITY ATTITUDES PERSONALITY SURVEY
On the following page are two open-ended questions. Please respond to them with
your first, natural response.
We are looking for peoples' gut-level reactions to these questions.
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The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment

This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality assessment. Recent
research suggests that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell us a
considerable amount about the individual's personality. Your responses to this
survey will be content-analyzed in order to assess certain dimensions of your
personality. Your honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated .
. 1. Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you.

-

2. Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you
physically die and once you are physically dead.
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The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment

This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality assessment. Recent
research suggests that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell us a
considerable amount about the individual's personality. Your responses to this
survey will be content-analyzed in order to assess certain dimensions of your
personality. Your honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated.
1. Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of dental pain arouses in you.

2. Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you
experience dentill pain and once you have physically experienced dental pain.

75

APPENDIXC
SUMMER DESCRIPTIONS
Stereotype inconsistent
"I spent the summer on campus, taking a summer engineering class for 9 credit hours. I
also worked at a software company around 20 hours a week to help furnish my expenses .

.
· I spent my free time playing chess with my roommate and reading. I actually re-read the
Lord of the Rings series. I also spent a week with my family touring Europe. The Eiffel
tower is amazing! All in all, I had a very productive and exciting summer."

Stereotype consistent
"All I did dis summer was sit around, watchin BET. that station is tight. If it aint to hot
outside me and my boyz kick it by ballin at the courts. When the weekend comes its time
to get my party on, its time to hit da clubs lookin for fine lookin honies. Somedays me
and my boyz get crunked, holla at some shorties and do our thang. I just be keepin it
real."

Neutral
"I spent the summer stuck in Nashville working as a lifeguard for TSU. I also took a
class, since I was stuck here, so I don't have to stress this semester. I pretty much spent
most ofmy free time hanging out with friends, watching movies, playing my X-box and
even went out a couple nights. I also went home a couple times to visit family members
and high school friends. Basically, it was a normal summer."
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APPENDIXD
PICTURES
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APPENDIXE
CYBERBALL
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APPENDIX F
NEED FOR CLOSURE
Please indicate your level of agreement to the following statements from 1 {strongly
disagree) to 6 ( strongly agree)
Strongly
Disagree

1. I think that having clear rules
and order at work is essential for
success.
2. Even after I've made up my
mind about something, I am
always eager to consider a
different opinion
3. I don't like situations that are
uncertain.
4. I dislike questions which could
be answered in many different
ways.
5. I like to have friends who are
unpredictable.
6. I find that a well ordered life
with regular hours suits my
temperament.
7. When dining out, I like to go to
places where I have been before
so that I know what to expect.
8. I feel uncomfortable when I
don't understand the reason why
an event occurred in my life.
9. I feel irritated when one person
disagrees with what everyone else
in a group believes.
10. I hate to change my plans at
the last minute.
11. I don't like to go into a
situation without knowing what I
can expect from it.

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

Prefer
not to
respond

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
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Strongly
Disagree

12. When I go shopping, I have difficulty
deciding exactly what it is that I want.
13. When faced with a problem I usually
see the one best solution very quickly.
14. When I am confused about an
important issue, I feel very upset.
15. I tend to put off making important
decisions until the last possible moment.
16. I usually make important decisions
quickly and confidently.
17. I would describe myself as indecisive.
18. I think it is fun to change my plans at
the last moment.
19. I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a
new situation without knowing what
might happen.
20. My personal space is usually messy
and disorganized.
21. In most social conflicts, I can easily
see which side is right and which is
wrong.
22. I tend to struggle with most decisions.
23. I believe that orderliness and
organization are among the most
important characteristics of a good
student.
24. When considering most conflict
situations, I can usually see how both
sides could be right.
25. I don't like to be with people who are
capable of unexpected actions.
26. I prefer to socialize with familiar
friends because I know what to expect
from them.

Strongly
Agree

I

2 3 4 5

6

Prefer not
to respond

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0
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27. I think that I would learn best in a
class that lacks clearly stated objectives
and requirements.
28. When thinking about a problem, I
consider as many different opinions on
the issue as possible.
29. I like to know what people are
thinking all the time.
30. I dislike it when a person's statement
could mean many different things.
31. It's annoying to listen to someone who
cannot seem to make up his or her mind.
32. I find that establishing a consistent
routine enables me to enjoy life more.
33. I enjoy having a clear and structured
mode of life.
34. I prefer interacting with people whose
opinions are very different from my own.
35. I like to have a place for everything
and everything in its place.
36. I feel uncomfortable when someone's
meaning or intention is unclear to me.
37. When trying to solve a problem I
often see so many possible options that
it's confusing.
38. I always see many possible solutions
to problems I face.
39. I'd rather know bad news than stay in
a state of uncertainty.
40. I do not usually consult many
different opinions before forming my own
view.
41. I dislike unpredictable situations.
42. I dislike the routine aspects of my
work (studies).

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0

0 0 0 0

0

0

0
0

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

0
0

0
0

1
Strongly
Disagree

2 3 4 5 6
Strongly
Agree

Prefer not
to respond

81

APPENDIX G
PANAS-X
Please indicate below how descriptive the following traits are of you.

1. cheerful
2. disgusted
3. attentive
4. bashful
5. sluggish
6. daring
7. surprised
8. strong
9. scornful
10. relaxed
11. irritable
12. delighted
13. inspired
14. fearless
15. disgusted
16.sad
17. calm
18. afraid
19. tired
20. amazed
21. shaky
22.happy
23. timid
24. alone
25. alert
26. upset
27. angry
28. bold
29. blue
30. shy

very
slightly

a little

moderately

quite a
bit

extremely

prefer
not to
respond

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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very
a little
slightly
31. active
32. guilty
33. joyful
34. nervous
35. lonely
36. sleepy
37. excited
38. hostile
39. proud
40. jittery
41. lively
42. ashamed
43. at ease
44. scared
45. drowsy
46. angry at self
47. enthusiastic
48. downhearted
49. sheepish
50. distressed
51. blameworthy
52. determined
53. frightened
54. astonished
55. interested
56. loathing
57. confident
58. energetic
59. concentrating
60. dissatisfied
with self

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

very
a little
slightly

quite a
moderately
bit
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

quite a
moderately
bit

prefer
extremely not to
respond
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

extremely

prefer
not to
respond
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APPENDIX H
GROWING STONE
Research suggests that attitudes and perceptions about even very common everyday items
may be related to basic personality characteristics. To further examine this idea, we
would like you to complete the opinion questionnaire on the following page with your
most natural response.
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Opinion Questionnaire 1: Literature
Please read the following short passage from a novel and answer the questions below it.
The automobile swung clumsily around the curve in the red sandstone trail, now a mass
of mud. The headlights suddenly picked out in the night-first on one side of the road, then on
the other-two wooden huts with sheet metal roofs. On the right near the second one, a tower of
course beams could be made out in the light fog. From the top of the tower a metal cable,
invisible at its starting-point, shone as it sloped down into the light from the car before
disappearing behind the embankment that blocked the road. The car slowed down and stopped a
few yards from the huts.
The man who emerged from the seat to the right of the driver labored to extricate himself
from the car. As he stood up, his huge, broad frame lurched a little. In the shadow beside the car,
solidly planted on the ground and weighed down by fatigue, he seemed to be listening to the
idling motor. Then he walked in the direction of the embankment and entered the cone of light
from the headlights. He stopped at the top of the slope, his broad back outlined against the
darkness. After a moment he turned around. In the light from the dashboard he could see the
chauffeur's black face, smiling. The. man signaled and the chauffeur turned of the motor. At once
a vast cool silence fell over the trail and the forest. Then the sound of the water could be heard.
The man looked at the river below him, visible solely as a broad dark motion flecked
with occasional shimmers. A denser motionless darkness, far beyond, must be the other bank. By
looking fixedly, however, one could see on that still bank a yellowish light like an oil lamp in the
distance. The big man turned back toward the car and nodded. The chauffeur switched off the
lights, turned them on again, then blinked them regularly. On the embankment the man appeared
and disappeared, taller and more massive each time he came back to life. Suddenly, on the other
bank of the river, a lantern held up by an invisible arm back and forth several times. At a final
signal from the lookout, tlie man disappeared into the night. With the lights out, the river was
shining intermittently. On each side of the road, the dark masses of forest foliage stood out
against the sky and seemed very near. The fine rain that had soaked the trail an hour earlier was
still hovering in the warm air, intensifying the silence and immobility of this broad clearing in the
virgin forest. In the black sky misty stars flickered.

How do you feel about the overall descriptive qualities of the story?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

not at all

somewhat

very

descriptive

descriptive

descriptive

Do you think the author of this story is male or female?

- - - male

- - - female
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APPENDIX I
ATTITUDE AND TRAIT MEASURES
Trait- Self Instructions
Please rate yourself on the following scale as you think the other participants will
perceive you from only your picture and the description of your summer by indicating
your agreement with the character traits listed below.
· Trait-Other Instructions

Please rate the person shown above on the following scale by indicating your agreement
with the character traits listed below.
not at
all

extremely

1

2

3

5

4

6

prefer not to
respond
C

1. Intelligent

C

C

C

C

r

C

2. Conceited

C

C

C

r

C

C

C

3. Nice

C

C

C

C

C

C

r

4. Arrogant

C

C

C

C,

C,

C,

C

5. Antisocial

C

C

C

C

C

C

6. Trustworthy

C

C

C
C

C

C

C,

C

7. Hostile

C

C

C

r

r

C

C

8. Hardworking

C

r

C

C

C

C

r

9. Athletic

C

C

C

C

C

r

10. Friendly

C
C,

C

C

C

C

C

r

11. Freeloader

C

C:,

C

r,

r

r

C

12. Productive

C

C

r

C

C

C

C
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Attitude rating- Self: Instructions and Measures
Please indicate your level of agreement with the statements below using the following
scale. Remember; please rate these statements as you think others will perceive you
from your picture and summer description.
Strongly
Disagree
1
2
1. I think people will say that
'm a nice person.
2. I think people will say they
!Would be interested in getting
foknowme.
3. I think people will say they
twould be interested in
socializing with me.
4. I think people will say they
rwould want to avoid me.
5. I think people will Slly that
OC'm the kind of person they
!Would associate themselves
iwith.
6. I think people will say
lthey'd like to talk to me.
7. I think people will say that
~hey would like to work on a
school project with me.

Strongly
Agree
5
prefer not to responc
6

4

3

("

("

("

("

("

C

("

("
~

C

r

C

("

("

("

0

r

0

0

r

("

("

C

r

0

r

r

("

r

r

r

0

("

r

("

r

r

C

C

r

C

r

C

r

C

0

C

C

r

C

87

Attitude Rating- Other

~

Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements about the person
above using the following scale.

1. I think I would like
~his person.
2. I am interested in
getting to know this
person.
3. I am interested in
socializing with this
oerson.
4. I would avoid this
person.
5. This person is not
someone I would
associate with.
6. I would not want to
talk to this person.
7. I would want to
:Work with this person
ona school project.

-

Strongly
!Disagree
1
2

3

r

r,

r,

r

r

r

C

r

(",

C

r

0

r

r

r

r,

0

r

r,

r

r

r

(",

0

n

r

r

r

C

0

C

C

C

r

r

C

r

r

C

r

C

r

r

C

0

C

r

r

r

'

4

"

5

Strongly
Agree
prefer not to respond
6
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APPENDIXJ

PERCEIVED FREQUENCY OF BALL TOSSES
1. How often did you toss the ball to each of the other participants on a scale from 0100% (should add up to 100%).
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2. How often did the following participants toss you the ball on a scale from 0-100%
(should add up to 100%).
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APPENDIX K
MANIPULATIONS CHECKS AND FILLERS

Please respond to the following questions about the person shown above

1. Which school do you think this person is from?
UNI

TSU

C:

r

L"
I ---.--------..-.-.- . . - · · -.------

2. How old do you think this person is?
3. What race is this person?

4. How similar is this person to you?
Very
Similar

Not at all
Similar

r
1

r

C

2

3

4

5

r
6

Prefer
not to
respond
C
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5. Do you think this person is religious?
Not at all
Religious

r,

Very
Religious

r

("'.,

1

2

3

r

4

Prefer
not to
respond

r

r

6

5

6. If this person needed help, how likely would you be to help?
Not at all
Likely

r

Very
Likely

r

r
3

2

1

r

r

4

Prefer
not to
respond

r

r

6

5

7. Have you ever met or interacted with this person before?
Yes

No

Don't know

C

Prefer not to respond

r

('

8. Do you know this person?
Yes

No

r

r

Don't know

Prefer not to respond

r

('

9. Please rate on the following scale how stereotypical this person seems for
his/her race?
Not at all
Stereotypical

Very
Stereotypical

r

C

1

2

3

4

Prefer
not to
respon
d

r

r
5

6

r

